1. Because of the pressure of current developments in and concerning Darfur, there is only a single appendix, addressing the vexed but statistically critical question of "family size" in the August 2004 assessment of violent mortality by the Coalition for International Justice. [The materials to have been included in additional appendices may be found at various points in fourteen previous mortality assessments: see especially "Darfur Mortality Update, June 30, 2005," at http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=515&page=1, http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=listarticles&secid=' http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=listarticles&secid=8] ). Certainly there are no signs that Khartoum intends to end the "climate of impunity" remarked well over a year and a half ago by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.

2. ARTICLE Parliamentary immunity from prosecution enjoyed by deputies has once again started to dominate the agenda after the European Union reports released during the week call for an adjustment in accordance with the union norms and the proposal for lifting the immunities of deputies who req...

3. Many of these shortcomings have been detailed over the past year–––by the International Crisis Group, Refugees International, and the Brookings Institution/Bern University (see my two–part overview of this substantial body of research ["Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur," November 13 & 20, 2005], http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=535&page=1

4. Human Rights Watch also reports in its assessment of Khartoums command–and–control and reporting responsibilities: "The methodical use of aerial support to target civilians in the military campaign, despite protests from air force officers, also reflects the involvement of high–level officials in Khartoum." (page 58) The aerial military targeting of civilians, including children–––in the Nuba, in southern Sudan, in Darfur–––is an entirely characteristic military response by Khartoum (see my August 15, 2000 op/ed in The Washington Post on the bombing of humanitarian operations in southern Sudan, [1], and multiple analyses of bombing incidents throughout southern Sudan under the rubric: http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=listarticles&secid=1). http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=40&page=1

5. But then the UN Commission of Inquiry had no wish to embarrass the UN Secretariat with a genocide finding, knowing full well that the Security Council would be stymied by Chinese and Russian blocking actions, even were there an unambiguous finding of genocide (see my two–part analysis of the UN Commission of Inquiry report, February 2005, at http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=48'&page=1 and